I will argue that prominent accounts of the projectibility of SSGs fail to “naturalise” laws of nature sufficiently to incorporate the manifest interconnectedness of the subsystems which are described by the patterns we observe. This article aims to dispel the mystique around the projectibility of SSGs and disarm the myth that fundamental particles are required to conspire with each other in order to produce and maintain patterns at higher nomological levels. How is it that these fundamental particles, while being subject only to the laws of physics, manage to harmonise with each other in order to additionally bring about projectible generalisations at other levels? How do the particles which constitute an antelope ‘know’ to behave in such a way as to make Kleiber’s’ law turn out just right? What other information or constraints are they subject to? And how could they be subject to anything else if the domain of fundamental physics is closed? This apparent microscopic conspiracy can be found within any special science generalisation, and stands in need of explanation. However, at the fundamental level, the particles within the organisms it generalises over move about on trajectories that are determined solely by the laws of physics. As such, it is projectible (and supports counterfactuals, as well as underwriting explanations and predictions at the physiological level). Kleiber’s law is a non-fundamental law of nature, or a special science generalisation (SSG).
smaller organisms have greater rates of cell respiration per unit mass. So even though the mass of a cat is one hundred times that of a mouse, its metabolic rate is only thirty-two times greater, i.e.
That is, the rate of metabolic chemical reactions (breaking down organic matter and building cell components), per mass of the animal, is greater in smaller organisms. I argue for an account of special science laws that acknowledges the way in which the special sciences reduce to the fundamental physics, thereby dissolving the conspiracy, yet respects the methodological and explanatory autonomy of special science generalisations. I suggest a way out of the impasse via a naturalised approach which focusses on the genealogy of subsystems and encourages conceptual demonstrations of typicality for special science generalisations. In this paper I defend their account against these charges, arguing that they derive from a misunderstanding of the typicality claim. However, concerns have been raised about its ability to confer typicality upon special science generalisations in the way that is required. Albert and Loewer have proposed a theory of lawhood which supplements the Best System of fundamental laws with a statistical postulate over the initial conditions of the universe, thereby rendering special science generalisations highly probable, and dispelling the conspiracy. I hope your Sunday is lovely, and that you're reading something good.The aim of this paper is to debunk the assertion that miraculous “conspiracies” between fundamental particles are required to bring about the projectibility of special science generalisations. If anyone wants to join me in any of this, I would absolutely love that. A biography, a short story every month (I've already made a list), The House of Mirth (it was serialized from January through November, 1905, though hopefully I won't take that long to read it), The Age of Innocence (probably in the fall) and at least one, possibly two, trips to The Mount. Celebrating Edith Wharton's 151st birthday, properly this time.Re-reading Pride and Prejudice in January, in honor of its 200th birthday.I like making lists, even if I don't like making New Year's resolutions, and I was thinking over the weekend about what my reading plans for next year might look like.
Plan B is winning, and I'm happy about that, even if I regret it on Wednesday. Part of me wanted to spend winter break making lists, and baking bread, and reading fourteen books, and the other part of me wanted to be unproductive and peaceful.
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